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SPACTIVISM
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Adi Libson**
Gideon Parchomovsky***

Abstract
In this Essay, we propose a modified version of the SPAC, called the
Activist SPAC, that is uniquely designed to allow the public to
participate in the world of corporate activism. The version of the SPAC
that we envision is designed for investment in public companies, as
opposed to private ones. It is intended to improve the performance of the
target public company and change its course. Our version of the SPAC
also overcomes many of the problems that plague conventional SPACs.
At present, direct investment in activism is reserved to affluent
individuals and other professional investors of activist hedge funds. The
public at large is barred from directly entering the activist arena. The
current model comes at a triple price: first, critics argue that activism
in its current form is slanted toward short-termed engagements,
possibly neglecting potential profitable long-term engagements.
Second, although loud, the current scope of activism is in fact relatively
modest. Activist engagements reach but 2.3 percent of the public
companies traded on U.S. markets. Third, retail investors cannot
directly share in the excess profits stemming from activism.
The introduction of the Activist SPAC can change this reality. The
Activist SPAC would allow interested retail investors to invest money
in a corporation dedicated to Activist engagement. To ensure the
success of the enterprise, the future target of the investment would not
be made public at the time of the investment. Once the Activist SPAC
buys a toehold position in the target and announce its plan, the
investors would receive an opportunity to get their money back, should
they choose to do so, or go along with the activist plan. As we show in
the Essay, setting up Activist SPACs can transform the character of
corporate activism by rendering it more attuned to long-term
objectives, and is especially fit to pursue ESG goals. It would also give
the public a voice in the future world of activism and allow it to share
in its benefits directly as well as increase the scope of corporate activism.
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To enable these advantages, the current regulatory framework must
change. We present a blueprint for the introduction of Activist SPACs,
analyze the requisite key parameters and explore the legal and
regulatory steps required to ensure their success. Innovation is the
lifeblood of financial markets. The Activist SPAC may well mark their
future path.
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INTRODUCTION
There is much to commend about shareholder activism.1
Supporters of shareholder activism point to its potential to
1

See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) ("Hedge fund activism is
now a key aspect of the corporate landscape. Activists have been engaging
with influencing major American companies, and the media has been
increasingly referring to the current era as the 'golden age of activist
investing'"); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the
Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013); But cf. Martin Lipton, The Bebchuk
Syllogism, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corporate Governance (Aug. 26, 2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/26/the-bebchuk-syllogism/;
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enhance firm value by disciplining management and improving
corporate governance. At present, however, there is an inherent
limitation on the potential of shareholder activism to serve as an
antidote to corporate failures: its limited scale and uniform rigid
form. The central players in shareholder activism are activist
hedge funds. The resources they can deploy toward
engagements are limited: in 2020, activist hedge funds initiated
campaigns in only 80 (2.3 percent) of the 3463 publicly traded
firms with a market cap of at least $500 million.2 Needless to say
that only a fraction of the activist campaigns are successful.
Evidently, in its present form, shareholder activism falls short of
realizing its full potential.
The main reason for the limited reach of hedge funds is
regulatory. The regulatory framework that applies to activist
hedge funds practically forces them to raise money only from
private sources, such as private equity firms, pension funds and
affluent individuals, thus constraining their ability to increase
the funds that can be used toward engagements.3 Investments
from private sources are dwarfed by the universe of public
investments. The capital deployed by activist hedge funds in the
U.S. market in 2020 amounted to $16.1 billion.4 This sum may
seem large, but it is only a tiny fraction – 0.0322% – of the market
cap of all U.S. public firms, which exceeded $50 trillion.5

Martin Lipton, Do Activist Hedge Funds Really Create Long Term Value?,
Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corporate Governance (Jul. 22, 2014),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/07/22/do-activist-hedge-fundsreally-create-long-term-value/.
2 WILSHIRE, Wilshire 500 Total Market Index Fact Sheet, December 31, 2020,
https://www.wilshire.com/Portals/0/analytics/indexes/factsheets/wilshire-5000-fact-sheet.pdf; LAZARD 2020 REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM,
January
2021,
p.
6,
https://www.lazard.com/media/451536/lazards-2020-review-ofshareholder-activism-vf.pdf.
3 The investment of pension funds and other Institutional investors in activist
hedge funds, is on a relatively limited extent. See MORLEY, infra note 128 for
an explanation of the limited investment of institutional investors in activist
hedge funds.
4 Id.
5
SIBLIS RESEARCH, Total Market Value of U.S. Stock Market,
https://siblisresearch.com/data/us-stock-marketvalue/#:~:text=The%20total%20market%20capitalization%20of,about%20O
TC%20markets%20from%20here. (last visited June 15, 2021). It should be
noted that the share of the total positions of hedge funds from the total capital
of U.S. public markets is larger: The 16.1 billion reflects only the fresh capital
entering the market—but hedge funds still hold positions from prior years.
The total capital held by U.S. hedge funds at the end of 2018 is estimated at
$146B AUM. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Karmic Reckoning? Investors in Activist Hedge
Funds
Agitate
for
Change,
Reuters
(Jul.
30,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-hedgefunds-investors-focusidUSKCN1UP17T.
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Activist hedge funds are de-facto precluded from raising money
from the public because it would legally bar them from obtaining
their traditional compensation package.6 In addition, SEC
regulations condition raising funds from the public on extensive
and comprehensive disclosure. Specifically, there are strict
restrictions on public offerings that do not disclose a “specific
business plan or purpose.”7 Among other things, this regulation
requires the issuer to allow public investors to withdraw their
funds prior to the materialization of its business endeavour.
However, the business model of activist hedge funds critically
depends on secrecy until a later stage. Complying with the SEC
disclosure rules would inhibit activist hedge funds from forming
a position under the market’s radar – an indispensable aspect of
the business model shared by all activist hedge funds. activist
hedge funds search for underperforming companies, identify
major deficiencies, and then devise an alternative strategic
business plan, that will serve as a remedial measure and increase
their value. The recoupment of these costly undertakings comes,
if at all, months later when the activist hedge fund sells its shares.
For recoupment to occur, activist hedge funds must act covertly
until the time of the engagement, buying its major stake at a low
price. Otherwise, if information about the engagement reaches
the market ahead of time, the target’s share price will rise before
the activist buy its stake, which will foil the hedge fund’s plan by
rendering it much less profitable.8
In this Essay, we introduce a modified version of the Special
Purpose Acquisition Corporation (SPAC) which we dub the
Activist SPAC, which would enable activist hedge funds to raise
capital from the public. The Activist SPAC is a corporate form
uniquely designed for the special needs of shareholders activism.
Our proposal draws inspiration from an existing corporate form,
the Special Purpose Acquisition Corporation (SPAC). The SPAC
corporate form allows the public to commit funds to acquire a
private company. The private target is unknown at the time of
the investment, and the funds committed by individual investors
are held in trust until a target is identified. Once the target is
chosen, its identity is disclosed to the individual investors, who
get to decide whether to withdraw their money and receive
interest on their investment or go along with the acquisition plan.

Regarding the legal limitations on compensation packages of funds’
investment advisors imposed by the Investment Advisory Act, see infra, note
133.
7 17 C.F.R. § 230.419.
8 See, e.g., Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili, In Search of the Absent Shareholders: A
New Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55 (2016) (suggesting
utilizing behavioural nudges in order to overcome barriers to more active
engagement of retail investors, and tools that would facilitate their automatic
supports of activist campaigns by other professional actors).
6
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In 2020 alone, SPAC IPOs raised 83 billion dollars, four times as
much as all activist hedge funds.9
Similar to the traditional SPAC, the Activist SPAC would allow
the public to commit money to a concrete purpose. Yet, there
would be several critical differences between the two. As
opposed to the SPAC, Activist SPACs would target a public
company, selected for the purpose of an activism campaign,
rather than a private company. Limiting the Activist SPAC
investment to public firms, would also enable to overcome many
of the existing problems with traditional SPACs. Additionally,
the money invested in Activist SPACs would not be directed
toward a full acquisition of (or merger with) the public company,
but rather toward purchasing a block of shares, normally 5%10%,10 that would enable changing the course of the target
corporation.
Another difference between Activist SPACs and traditional
SPACs stems from the need of activist hedge funds to keep the
identity of the target corporation under wraps prior to the
engagement. Unlike the SPAC, the Activist SPAC would not be
required to announce the target prior to buying its shares.
Investors in the Activist SPAC would be given an opportunity
to redeem their investment following the announcement.
Following the acquisition of its stake in the putative target, the
Activist SPAC would have to disclose its planned strategy for
activism, in a similar form to the “white papers” that activist
hedge funds send to the management of the target company and
its major shareholders, convincing them why a certain change in
the company is needed.11 Such documents would detail the
strategic change they would like the company to adopt, present
material support for their claim that such a change is desirable
and feasible, and provide an estimate of the increase in value the
change may generate.
As is the case with traditional SPAC investors, Activist SPAC
investors would be able to redeem their shares and receive their

9 Joshua

Franklin, U.S. SPACs overtake 2020 haul in less than three months, REUTERS
(Mar.
17,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spac-usa-ipoidUSKBN2B919O.
10 Similar to the average stake held by an activist hedge fund. See. Simmons &
Simmons, Unlocking Value: The Role of Activist Alternative Investment Managers,
AIMA (2015), file:///C:/Users/Adi/Downloads/Unlocking%20Value%20%20The%20Role%20of%20Activist%20Alternative%20Investment%20Manag
ers.pdf (finding that activist hedge funds hold on average 9% of the stock of
the target).
11 See, Brandon R. Harper, The Dupont Proxy Battle: Successful Defense Measures
Against Shareholder Activism, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 120 (2016). ("The activist
will produce analyses and proposed remedies to what they believe are the
target company's shortcomings in the form of a 'white paper'").
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initial investment.12 Moreover, the Activist SPAC would have to
note in advance the rate of non-redeeming shareholders that
would be required for advancing its Activist campaign, and thus
also provide a market check on its strategy. A 50% threshold
seems reasonable, unless the Activist SPAC has reasons to
suggest a different threshold.
Importantly, the amount received upon redemption would be
capped at the amount of the initial investment, even if there is a
spike in the price of the target – and as a result, in the shares of
the Activist SPAC. Such cap would prevent a “stag hunt”
dynamic whereby investors may prefer to redeem their shares
right after the potential spike in the value of the target at the time
of the announcement, rather than wait until the goal of the
activist campaign are materialized.13 This dynamic, when shared
by many shareholders, could prevent the actual activist
campaign from being executed, as the capital the Activist SPAC
will have left to deploy may be insufficient, and may not even
pass the threshold of supporting shareholders it has determined.
The redemption right in Activist SPACs would be more
restricted than SPACs in two dimensions. First, the Activist
SPAC shareholders would have a redemption right only after
the company has formed its investment position. Second, they
would not have an absolute right to receive her initial investment
plus accrued interest. Because the Activist SPAC incurs costs
prior to selecting the target and the target’s share price may
depreciate, the funds available for redemption may, in some
cases, be lower than the funds initially invested. We believe that
this additional risk to Activist SPAC investors is warranted.
SPAC shareholders invest in private companies that are not
subject to the same stringent disclosure requirements that apply
to public ones and thus do not benefit from the price
transparency of publicly traded firms. Hence, there is a serious
risk that SPACs are overpaying for the target. Activist SPAC s, in
contrast, target public corporations that must comply with all
SEC regulations. Public corporations offer much greater
transparency, and therefore, pose a smaller risk to investors. In
other words, Activist SPAC shareholders are exposed to market
fluctuations in the share prices of the activism target, but not to
overvaluation by the Activist SPAC managerial team.
Implementation of our proposal can expand the horizons of
activism. If Activist SPACs manage to raise even 10% of the
amount raised by SPACs in 2020 (over $80 billion), it will
increase the resources available for shareholder activism
dramatically. Hence, the institutionalization of the Activist
SPAC has the potential to revamp capital markets and improve
the quality of corporate governance of boards by significantly
For discussion of the possibility that the investors will fund some of the
expenses the sponsor has incurred, such as underwriting expenses, see
supra, part II.B.
13 Regarding the dynamic of a “Stag Hunt” game, see infra, note 101.
12
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scaling up shareholder activism. Furthermore, Activist SPACs’
impact on activism is not limited only to scope – their
introduction is likely to improve the quality of activism. One of
the major critiques of hedge fund activism is that the structure of
such investment vehicle derives a focus on the short-term that
may be detrimental to the companies in which they invest in the
long run. Indeed, the average length of a hedge fund activism
campaign tends to be quite short,14 and many of them are aimed
at quick fixes.15
In contrast, Activist SPAC investors will be able to function as a
much more patient source of capital, for three main reasons.
First, unlike hedge funds that are structured as partnerships
from which their investors are precluded from exiting, the
Activist SPAC is structured as a public corporation whose
investors would be able to liquidate their investment at any point
in time. For this reason, Activist SPAC managers would face less
pressure to soothe investors with short-termed results: if
investors are not happy, they can always sell their share in the
Activist SPAC on the market. Second, investors in Activist
SPACs would be to commit only a tiny fraction of their wealth to
this goal and thereby remain diversified in their investments. .
Hedge funds by contrast, require high investment amounts that
largely negate diversification. The combination of small
investments and diversification would further ease of the
pressure on Activist SPAC managers, allowing them to make
prudent long term decisions. Third, unlike hedge funds that are
partnerships with a deadline for their dissolution, Activist
SPACs are public companies with no deadline for dissolution
and thus managers will be less time-pressured in their
investment.
Activist SPACs can, therefore, start a new tide in capital markets,
one that would leave a more sustainable impact on public
companies and corporate governance. Its actual impact on the
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2020 U.S. SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM AND ACTIVIST SETTELEMENT AGREEMENTS, December 2020, p. 27-28,
available at https://www.sullcrom.com/shareholder-activism-review-us2020 (finding that only approximately 10% of activist campaigns which were
initiated and settled in 2020 took six months or longer until settlment);
Fredrick Cedergren & Mangus Noack, Hedge Fund Activism in Europe: Are
Activist Hedge Funds Guardians of Shareholder Value? MASTER’S THESIS,
COPENHAGEN
BUSINESS
SCHOOL
1,
45
(2020),
https://research.cbs.dk/en/studentProjects/2b3e157d-12d0-4830-ad7a10232076dcc9 (finding that the median period of time for engagements of
activist hedge funds in Europe between 2010-2019 stood on 4.2 months and
the average on 9.2 months). But see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang
& Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 30 (2020)
(Finding that the average length of activist campaigns initiated between 20002013 was approximately 2.5 years). It should be noted that the data on which
the Bebchuk et al. study is based is at least almost a decade old.
15 Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 971, 991 (2019).
14
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market may be exponentially higher than the increase in activist
campaigns: the mere prospect of activist engagements exerts a
disciplining effect on all managements. In the face of high levels
of activism, managements would strive to improve their
performance to divert activists to other, less well-performing,
companies. Hence, activism generates positive spillover effects
and improves the performance of firms that have not been
engaged.16
Structurally, this Essay unfolds in four parts. Part I discusses the
promise and peril of shareholder activism, focusing on the
central limitation on activism: its relatively limited scale and
uniform rigid form. Part II introduces Activist SPAC and lays out
its design. Part III discusses the potential impact of Activist
SPACs on the market. Part IV discusses possible objections. A
short conclusion follows.
I. THE UNLOCKED POTENTIAL OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Shareholder activism has been a central theme in corporate law
scholarship in recent years. Prominent theorists believe that
shareholder activism is the key to improving corporate
performance. These scholars see shareholder activism as the cure
for many of the ailments caused by the agency problem.17
Evidently, it is hard to count on shareholders to supervise
managers. Critics have long expressed doubt regarding the
ability of shareholders to make use of their power, due to their
rational apathy disposition.18 Information gathering about firms
and market conditions is an expensive endeavour. The cost far
exceeds the potential benefits for most shareholders. Worse yet,
See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 896-901 (2013) (discussing the spill over effect of activism
on all firms); see also Adi Libson and Gideon Parchomovksy, Reversing the
Fortunes of Active Funds. 99 TEX. L. REV. 581, 494-95 (2021) (considering the
market-wide effect of activism in tailoring the tax credits for internalizing its
positive external effects).
17 This confidence that increasing shareholder engagement in the company has
potential in curing many of the market’s maladies, has lead Lucian Arye
Bebchuk to spear-headed a wide-ranging campaign that transcended the
boundaries of the academy for empowering shareholders and augment their
influence on corporations. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). An important facet of the
campaign was the shareholder rights project that encouraged market actors
to support and facilitate shareholder empowerment. These efforts bore fruit.
A considerable number of market actors heeded Bebchuck’s calls and have
adopted structures that enabled shareholders to influence the board and
management by eradicating poison pills and staggered boards clauses. See
Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
263, 277-273 (2019)
18 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 527 (1990).
16
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while the cost of collecting the necessary information falls
squarely on the individual shareholder who engages in this task,
the benefits accrue to all shareholders – giving rise to a collective
action problem.
Exercising “voice” in shareholder meetings gives rise to a similar
challenge. Dispersed shareholders must coordinate their
opinions and actions to use their “voice” effectively.
Coordination is costly in and of itself,19 and someone must bear
this cost. Once again, each individual shareholder would prefer
that her colleagues shoulder this cost. Yet, this mode of thinking,
though individually rational, undermines collective action.
Some theorists have pinned their hopes on institutional
shareholders as a solution to the rational apathy of individual
shareholders. Professor Bernie Black has pointed out that
institutional investors, on account of their size and clout, face a
different incentive matrix than individual investors. They do not
suffer from the rational apathy problem, so goes the argument,
since their expected benefit from an increase in firm value due to
corporate changes may easily exceed the expected costs involved
in activism.20 Furthermore, they can utilize their “voice”
effectively without the help of others. Given their sheer market
size, their financial sophistication and business acumen, their
active involvement in firms will leave an enormous market
impact.
Notwithstanding their potential, however, most institutional
investors fail to fulfil the promise. Professors Ronald Gilson and
Jeffery Gordon have explained that the relative passivity of
institutional investors stems from the fact that it does not pay off,
even for them, to engage in active monitoring of firms. The prime
interest of institutional investors is not the absolute returns on
their investments, but rather their relative performance
compared to their peers. Investing in active engagements does
not improve their relative performance; on the contrary, it may
even lower it.21 Traditional institutional investors are therefore
“rationally reticent”.22
Gilson and Gordon have observed that Activist hedge funds are
not as diversified as other institutional shareholders, and thus
have the incentive to invest in information gathering and
processing. The appreciation in a company’s share price can
surpass the significant costs involved in engaging its
See, e.g., William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents and
Takeout Mergers: The Case against Fiduciary Duties, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 341,
366 (1983).
20 Black, supra note 18, at 585; Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The
Promise of Institutional Investors, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 827-829 (1992)
21 GILSON & GORDON, supra note 16 at 899-890
22 Id. at 889 ("Mutual funds and other for-profit investment managers are almost
uniformly reticent – very rarely proactive but responsive to others'
proposals").
19
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management. Moreover, the business model of Activist hedge
funds allows them to mobilize traditional institutional investors
to join their campaign. After an Activist hedge fund has invested
in deciphering the firm’s weakness and the proper solution for
its weaknesses, other institutional investors, such as the large
mutual fund families, need not bear any additional cost and can
gain from supporting Activist hedge funds’ campaigns. A
similar argument has also been suggested by Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Hirst.23
The first corporate law scholar to identify the potential of activist
hedge funds to reduce agency costs was Professor Bill Bratton.24
Almost contemporaneously, professors Marcel Kahan and
Edward Rock pointed out the ability of corporate hedge funds to
act as “true owners” and provide effective monitoring of
management.25 Shortly thereafter, Jonathan Macy lauded activist
hedge funds as “the newest big thing in corporate governance.”26
On the empirical side, Alon Brav, Wei Jang, Frank Partnoy, and
Randall Thomas, who conducted a comprehensive empirical
analysis of activist hedge funds, found that their engagements
improve the performance of the target in two thirds of the cases,
and yield an abnormal return of seven percent above market.27
It should be emphasized that not all corporate law scholars agree
that activist hedge fund engagements are value enhancing. Some
commentators have argued that while of activist hedge fund
engagements increase value in the short run, they lead to loss of
value in the long-term.28 activist hedge fund engagements often
focus on cost-cutting, dividend distributions, spin-offs, and the
sale of the company. All those goals have some short-term flavor.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 106 (2017).
24 William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L. J. 1375
(2007).
25 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1047 (2007) (noting the potential of
activist hedge funds to act as ‘real owners’). See also Frank Partnoy & Randall
Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds and Financial Innovation in NEW FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 101
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007).
26 JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 241 (2008)
27 Alon Brav, Wei Jang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008); See also
BRATTON, supra note 24 at 1381(pointing to the fact that high success rate of
activist hedge funds of getting targets to accede to their demands, reduces
significantly the agency problem generated by the separation of ownership
and control).
28 Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Activist Hedge Funds
and the Corporation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 261, 265 (2016) ("Indeed, attempting
to measure long-term valuations is the only method that can address the main
challenge raised by the critics of activism, according to which hedge funds
would profit from activism at the expense of a firm's long-term value").
23
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A prime target for activists is the research and development
(“R&D”) budget of firms. Eliminating investments in R&D leads
to a rise in the share price in the short-term, but often harms the
company and its shareholders in the long-term. Naturally, the
question whether activist hedge fund campaigns have a positive
or negative impact on firm value is an empirical one. Yet, the
empirical studies on this issue do not offer an unequivocal
answer.
Some studies have demonstrated that hedge fund activism has a
positive impact on share value in the long run.29 However, the
vast majority of activist hedge fund campaigns do not last more
than two years and only in few cases campaigns last over three
years.30 Even if there is no disparity between short and long term
results, it is widely accepted that there is a tendency among
activist hedge funds to limit themselves to relatively short
engagements. By and large, current activist hedge funds forego
opportunities for lengthy engagements enduring several years.
The main reason for the “impatient” character of the capital of
hedge funds is that hedge funds are structured as limited
partnerships. Thus, investments in them are illiquid and opaque.
Hedge funds need to meet “milestones” in order to reassure their
investors that their investment is moving in the right direction.
For this reason, they have to pursue relatively frequent events of
realization of profits.
Even if one accepts the view that activist hedge funds have the
potential to monitor firms effectively, there is an additional
limitation on the potential of activist hedge funds to improve the
performance of firms: their limited scope. The resources held by
the activist hedge fund industry is estimated at approximately
$200 billion.31 This sum may seem large on a standalone basis,
but it constitutes 0.4% of the aggregate value of public companies
in U.S. capital markets, which has surpassed $50 trillion.32 It
Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 1.
See supra, note 14.
31 Seva Herbst-Bayliss, Karmic Reckoning? Investors in Activist Hedge Funds
Agitate
for
Change,
REUTERS
(Jul.
30,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-hedgefunds-investors-focusidUSKCN1UP17T.
32 See supra, note 5. It should be noted that the actual percentage of the U.S.
market cap that hedge funds could acquire is even lower. Much of the
resources of activist hedge funds have to divert to funding their campaign in
addition to funding its management and employees, and not solely to
purchasing stakes in public companies. For example, in Engine 1’s recent
campaign in Exxon it had purchased shares for $50 million but spent $30
million—over 50% of its initial acquisition—on the campaign. See Christopher
M. Matthews, Exxon vs. Activists: Battle Over Future of Oil and Gas Reaches
Showdown, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/exxonvs-activists-battle-over-future-of-oil-and-gas-reaches-showdown11621950967?mod=hp_lead_pos7. This may be an extreme example, but it
demonstrates that activist hedge funds have to spend a sizeable amount of
their capital on campaign spending.
29
30
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bears emphasis that the capital available for deployment in a
campaign is much lower. This is because a considerable
percentage of the capital of activist hedge funds is tied to exiting
investments that have not yet materialized. The aggregate
amount deployed by activist hedge funds in 2020 was $16.1
billion, a tiny fraction of the capital they control.33 This amounts
to only 0.0322% of the market cap of all U.S. public firms.
It is true that activist hedge funds do not rely exclusively on their
own funds: institutional investors support many activist hedge
fund campaigns, augmenting the investments of activist hedge
funds.34 However, the activist hedge fund’s own capital largely
dictates the number of companies it can engage. It must form an
initial sizeable stake in the target, which, in turn, determines its
potential profits from an engagement. To illustrate, assume that
a hedge fund could convince other institutional investors that
own over 50% of a public company to cooperate in a campaign
that has a potential to increase the value of the company by 50%
with a probability of 0.5, even when it holds 0.1% of the
companies’ shares. Assume further that the value of the
company is $10 billion and thus the stake of the Activist is worth
$10 million. The cost of the campaign – convincing the other
shareholders to support the activist hedge fund strategy – is $5
million. In this case, it is not worthwhile for the hedge fund to
engage the company. The expected value of such engagement is
zero, even though it has the support of institutional investors.35
If the stake of the activist hedge fund were larger – say, $100
million – the engagement would have a positive value of $45
million.
Our analysis thus far has omitted the up-front expenditures that
activist hedge funds must incur. These include the cost of
detecting the opportunity and forming the strategy, as well as
the uncertainty regarding the support of institutional investors.
Once these costs are added to the analysis, it becomes apparent
that the stake of the activist hedge fund in the target needs to be
greater than previously suggested. and in the previous example
may need to reach $200 million or more. Indeed, in 2020, the

See supra, note 2
For example, only recently a small new hedge fund—“engine 1” was able to
obtain 2 seats on the board of a blue chip company, Exxon, in a plan to reduce
its dependency on drilling and increase its investment in renewable energy.
Engine 1 stake in Exxon, may not seem small— around 50 million—but in a
huge public company like Exxon, that has a market cap of $258 billion, Engine
1’s shares constitute only %0.2 of Exxon’s shares. Engine 1 was still able to
succeed in its campaign due to the cooperation and support of the 3 largest
institutional investors—BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard. See Matt
Levine, Exxon Has a Tough Green Activist, BLOOMBERG, May 26, 2021,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-26/exxon-has-atough-green-activist.
35 It will gain $5 million from the implementation of the successful strategy, but
it had also to incur a similar cost on the campaign.
33
34
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average value of hedge funds’ stake in a target stood at $231
million.36
Activism data reflect the limited number of targets that activist
hedge funds can profitably engage. In 2020, activist hedge funds
have initiated campaigns in only 80 of the 3500 public companies
in the U.S. States that have a market value above $500 million.
Put differently, activist hedge fund engagements in 2020 covered
only 2.3% of the market.37 This figure is not an outlier. The
number of companies engaged by activist hedge funds declined
from the peak of 124 companies in 2018, to 107 in 2019, to 80 in
2020.38 The capital constraints on activist campaigns in U.S.
companies are likely to intensify with the opening of European
and other foreign capital markets to activism. In 2016, 66% of
global activism took place in U.S. firms. 39 That figure has been
constantly declining over the years. In 2020, only 45% of the
global activist activity took place in U.S. firms.40 The greater
penetration of American activist hedge funds to foreign markets
leaves less available capital for deployment in the U.S.
It may seem that hedge funds are flush with cash, but in reality,
they face significant barriers when they raise funds. Activist
hedge funds are essentially barred by regulation from raising
funds in the large capital pool of public funds. The desire of
hedge funds to secure funding from public sources can be
discerned from the decision of numerous managers of large
activist hedge funds to turn to SPACs to raise funds. Pershing
Square, one of the largest and reputable activist hedge funds,
raised significant funds from the public via SPACs.41 Elliot
Management, also one of the leading activist hedge funds, is also
raising funds via a SPAC.42 Likewise, Daniel Loeb, the manager
of the activist hedge fund Third Point, has raised public funds

The average stake is 231 million, calculated by dividing the capital deployed
globally by activists ($39.6 billion) by the global number of campaigns (173).
See: LAZARD, supra note 2 at 2. Besides the lower upside of small stakes, they
also require higher spending on the campaign, given the larger amount of
investors they have to convince in order to implement their strategy. The
example above of the Engine 1 engagement in Exxon, may exemplify this: the
high spending on the campaign (30 million for a 50 million stake) may stem
(in addition to the high market cap of the target and the high costs of proxy
fights( from the relatively low stake of Engine 1 in Exxon: 0.2%.
37 Supra, note 2.
38 LAZARD, supra note 2.
39 Id., at 5.
40 Id.
41 Michael J. de la Merced, The Year in Deal Can Be Summed Up in 4 Letters, NY
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/elliott-managementexplores-raising-a-spac-11612730235 (noting that Ackman’s Pershing Square
Tonight Holdings was the largest SPAC IPO, reaching $4 billion).
42 Cara Lombardo, Elliot Management Explores Raising a SPAC, WALL ST. J., Feb.
7,
2021,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/elliott-management-exploresraising-a-spac-11612730235
36
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through the SPAC Far Point Acquisition Crop.43 More generally,
in the first quarter of 2021 alone, nine SPACs sponsored by
activist professionals have raised funds, including Elliot, Corvex,
Glenview, Hudson Executive, and Starboard Value.44 While the
funds of all these SPACs can only be invested in private
companies and cannot be used on public companies, the use of
SPACs by large activist hedge funds reflects their “hunger” for
additional funding from public capital markets. Because public
funds are unavailable for their regular course of business and
expertise, they venture to the realm of SPACs. It therefore seems
that the current funding sources available to activist hedge funds
are insufficient to enable them to realize their full potential.
In the next part, we will propose a novel vehicle that will enable
activist hedge funds to tap into public capital pools and scale-up
their activism.
II. SCALING-UP ACTIVISM: INTRODUCING ACTIVIST SPACS
A. The Backdrop of Activist SPAC
1. Overview of SPACs
2020 was the year of the SPAC: SPACs raised over $83 billion in
IPOs.45 This sum constitutes 46% of the total proceeds from IPOs
in US markets, which have reached over $179 billion.46 The $83
billion figure represents an increase of 15% compared to the $72.2
billion raised in 2019, which represented 19% of the total amount
raised in IPOs that year.47 The success of SPACs has continued in
2021. As of March 2021, the aggregated proceeds of SPAC IPOs
have surpassed $80.5 billion, representing 70% of the total
proceeds of IPOs in the U.S.48 The increase in SPAC activity is
not limited to aggregated proceeds; it is also reflected in the
number of SPACs that underwent an IPO. In 2019 there were 59
IPOs of SPACs, in 2020 the number more than quadrupled,
reaching 248. This number was surpassed in the first quarter of
2021, with 252 SPAC IPOs as of March 15, 2021.49
The main reason for the popularity of SPACs in recent years is
the proliferation of private companies with high market value. It
is not only “unicorns” – private companies with a value of over
Cara Lombardo, Far Point to Buy Global Blue From Silver Lake, WALL ST. J., Jan.
16, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/far-point-acquisition-nears-deal-tobuy-global-blue-from-silver-lake-11579170605
44
LAZARD, Q1 2021 Review of Shareholder Activism, p. 18 (2021),
https://www.lazard.com/media/451619/lazards-q1-2021-review-ofshareholder-activism-vf.pdf
45
SPAC
ANALYTICS,
SPAC
and
US
IPO
activity,
https://www.spacanalytics.com/ (last visited March 15, 2021)
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
43
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one billion dollars – but also “decacorns” - private companies
valued at over 10 billion dollars, such as Uber, WeWork, Airbnb,
SpaceX, and Pinterest -- that have attracted the attention of retail
investors. The merger of a SPAC with such companies serves
both the interests of the SPAC investors and of the target
company. SPAC mergers enable individual investors to partake
of the success of growing companies. Many investors do not
have access to private equity channels, and their only way to
invest in such companies is via public markets. A SPAC merger
also serves the interest of the target company: it enlarges the
potential capital pool available to the target by allowing it to tap
into public money and increases the liquidity of prior
investments, allowing founders and employee to cash in on their
stock and options.50 Most importantly, a SPAC merger enables
the target private company to circumvent the full costs and
requirements of an IPO, especially those associated with the rigid
and detailed disclosure via a prospectus. The target of a SPAC
will have to disclose information in the merger with the SPAC,
but with greater flexibility.51

50See,

e.g., Mike Bellin, Why Companies are Joining the SPAC Boom, PWC (Sep. 22,
2020),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/blog/spacboom.html.
51 A main difference between the disclosure requirement in the IPO and that of
a merger is the more limited legal liability in the case of the latter, in respect
to forward-looking statements and projections. In contrast to potential legal
liability for forward looking statements in IPOs, forward looking statements
disclosure in the context of mergers benefit from a safe-harbour protection
from legal liability. See KLAUSNER ET AL., infra note 54 at 5. But see John Coates,
ACTING DIRECTOR DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE AT THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION PUBLIC STATEMENT, SPACs, IPOs and Liability Risk
Under the Securities Laws (April 8, 2021) https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/spacs-ipos-liability-risk-under-securities-laws (arguing the that
the legal distinction between disclosure in the context of an IPO and
disclosure in the context of a SPAC merger is questionable).
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Table 1

2. How does a SPAC work?
A SPAC, also known as a “blank check company”, is a company
with no commercial operations that raises capital from the public
in an IPO in order to merge with an unspecified private
company.52 Thus, SPACs enable private companies to raise funds
indirectly from the public, without going through the process of
an IPO. The basic structure of SPACs, as well as certain
requirements that apply to them is determined by SEC
regulation, but many common features of SPACs are based on
accepted market practices.

Based on data from Spacanalytics, https://www.spacanalytics.com/.

SPACs are formed by sponsors, usually professionals with
relevant expertise, but in some cases even celebrities, such as
Shaquille O’Neal. These celebrities have no background in
investments or capital markets, but are able to attract large
numbers of investors thanks to their high profile.53 The lifespan
of a SPAC can be divided into four phases: the pre-IPO phase,
the post IPO search phase, the announcement phase, and the
merger phase, dubbed as de-SPAC merger.
The pre-IPO phase is defined by the SPAC’s formation. A SPAC
is set up by a sponsor, who purchases a block of shares at a
nominal price, commonly equivalent to 25% of the SPAC’s
equity. This block of shares is dubbed as the sponsor’s
“promote,” and provides her with a financial interest in the
Lola Miranda Hale, SPAC: A Financing Tool with Something for Everyone, 2 J.
CORP ACCT. & FIN. 67 (2007).
53 Kori Hale, Shaq Moves Into SPACs With Former Disney Execs & MLK Jr.’s Son,
FORBES
(Oct.
20,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/korihale/2020/10/20/shaq-moves-intospacs-with-former-disney-execs--mlk-jrs-son/?sh=72ce0ba16c77.
52
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success of the SPAC, as well as compensation for her work in
forming and operating the SPAC. In addition, the sponsor
purchases additional shares and warrants for their fair market
value. The proceeds from these transactions enable the sponsor
to cover the cost of the IPO. The main cost is that of an
underwriter. Although the formation of a SPAC does not require
a regular prospectus, these costs are still significant, varying
between 5% and 5.5% of the SPAC IPO proceeds (compared with
underwriter costs range of between 6.1%-6.8% of a conventional
IPO of comparable size).54
The second phase is the post-IPO search phase. During this
period, the SPAC searches for a target with which to merge. This
phase is limited by regulation to a period of two years.55 During
this period, all proceeds from the IPO are held in a trust account
accumulating interest.
The third phase is the announcement phase: occurring after the
SPAC has detected a potential target and proposes a deal for a
merger. At this point, the shareholders of the SPAC have the
option to redeem their shares for the price paid in the IPO stage,
plus the interest accumulated in the trust. In many cases, the
redeeming shareholders keep warrants that were granted to
them in the IPO phase together with the shares. This is done to
compensate investors for the period of time that their cash was
“trapped” in the SPAC trust account. Both sides of the merger—
the SPAC and the target—cannot know the amount of cash that
will be available for the actual merger after the announcement,
since it depends on the number of shareholders who choose not
to exercise their redemption option and withdraw the sums they
invested. For that reason, most mergers with SPACS are
accompanied by a private equity firm, an institutional investor,
or a commitment of the sponsor, to fill in some portion of the
amount that will be redeemed.
The fourth and final phase is the de-SPAC merger: The SPAC
shareholders vote on the proposed merger with the private
company. Once the merger is approved, the shareholders of the
target receive shares in the merged company, typically leaving
the SPAC shareholders with a minority interest.56
Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2021), 21
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3720919.
As
Klausner et al. note, of that fee 3.5% are conditioned on the SPAC
consummating a merger and deferred till that point in time. They also note
that the actual fee from the proceeds that are actually funnelled toward the
target company is higher. Given that a high amount of shares are redeemed
before the merger—a mean of 58%--the actual underwriting fees from the
proceeds transferred to the target are much higher and are around 11%. See
id., at 22).
55 Regulatory Notice 08-54: Guidance on Special Purpose Acquisition Companies,
FINRA, 2020, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/08-54.]
56 KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 8. Till this point in time, only a small
fraction of SPACs have liquidated because they weren’t able to complete a
54
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3. The Advantages of SPACs
Commentators have pointed to at least three key advantages of
SPAC mergers over IPOs. The first is that a SPAC merger is said
to be cheaper for the target company and its founders because it
avoids the “IPO pop.” The “IPO pop” is a phenomenon where
share prices typically increase in the first day of trading by an
average of 14%.57 This increase reflects the fact that in most IPOs,
the underwriters under-price the shares of the issuing company
to benefit their clients who participate in the IPO. This systematic
undervaluation constitutes what scholars have dubbed as
“money left on the table” – the issuing company does not receive
the full value of its shares in the IPO.58 There are no such “pricepops” in SPAC mergers as the pricing mechanism of the merger
of the SPAC is much different from an IPO.59 The elimination of
the price pop that accompanies IPOs, enables SPACs to transfer
a larger amount of cash to the target company for the same
equity share to its new shareholders.
The second benefit of SPACs is pricing certainty. While the price
of an IPO depends on the valuation of numerous actors during
the IPO roadshow, the price to be paid in a SPAC merger
depends only on the valuation by the SPAC sponsors. Although
there is no certainty regarding the actual amount transferred
from the SPAC to the target after redemption, which depends on
the redemption rate – the valuation of the deal is locked.60 In
many cases, the SPAC merger agreement will include a backup
of private investor (private investment in public equity - PIPE) in
order to increase the certainty of the closing of the merger, given
merger. Out of a total of 944 SPACs, only 90 have liquidated without merging.
See Summary of SPACS, SAPC ANALYTICS, https://www.spacanalytics.com/
(last visited April 26,2021). It should be noted that these numbers may not
reflect the real probability that the SPACs in the market today will liquidate.
As noted above, the large majority of these SPACs have incorporated in the
last year. Only a small fracture of the operating SPACs have reached the end
of the 2 year window. Thus, in the future, the proportion of liquidating SPACs
might be higher.
57 Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why don’t issuers get upset about leaving money
on the table in
IPOs? 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 413, 436 (2002). There are scholars that dispute the
observation that there is money left on the table in IPOs, claiming that that
company could not have sold a sizeable amount of its shares in the maximum
price of the first day of trading, and that the high price is generated by a very
small group of overly optimistic investors. See, e.g., R. Jay & Ivo Welch, A

review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795 (2002).
Id. at 413
Id. at 30
60 See, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, What You Need to Know
About SPACs, Investor Alerts and Bulletins, Dec. 10, 2020,
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/what-you-needknow-about-spacs-investor-bulletin (“Certain market participants believe
that, through a SPAC transaction, a private company can become a publicly
traded company with more certainty as to pricing and control over deal terms
as compared to traditional initial public offerings or IPOs”).
58
59

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3993847

[2022]

SPACTIVISM

19

the uncertainty regarding the actual amount transferred. The
PIPE replaces redemptions up to a certain threshold to reach the
minimum capital required for the transaction to be executed.61
The third advantage of SPAC mergers relative to an IPO is their
speed. SPAC mergers enable companies to become publicly
traded much faster than conventional IPOs – weeks instead of
months.62 SPAC mergers are not subject to the expansive
disclosure requirements that apply to IPOs and can thus be
completed more expeditiously.63
Furthermore, SPACs provide an additional advantage for
investors: they enable investors who do not have access to
private equity to bet on the skills of the management of the SPAC
in identifying an attractive target. For this reason, SPACs have
been dubbed a “poor man’s private equity.”64
4. Disadvantages of SPACs
While some have lauded SPACs as a mechanism to perfect
capital markets, some commentators are quite critical of the
aforementioned efficiencies of SPACs. The strongest criticism of
SPACs comes from the market itself: the average return on
investments in SPACs is significantly lower than most market
benchmarks. Out of 14 SPACs that announced and completed a
merger between the beginning of 2019 and February 10, 2021, 10
have reported a depreciation in value in the period of one month
after the merger.65 The most relevant benchmark – the IPO index
– has significantly out-performed the return on SPACs that
executed a merger in the period between the beginning of 2019
and June 2020. The mean return on SPACs in the three months
after the merger was -2.9%, which is 13.1% percent lower than
the IPO index for the same period, generating a positive return
of 10.2%. Longer time frames only worsen the picture for SPACs:
returns on SPACs 12 months after merger have trailed the IPO
See KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 10.
BRIDGE POINT CAPITAL, SPAC vs. Traditional IPO & Reverse Takeover,
http://18.218.104.51/spac-vs-ipo/ (last visited March 16, 2021) [“As
compared to traditional IPOs, SPAC IPOs can be significantly quicker. Due to
its lack of fundamental operation, both financial statements an prospectus
filed during a SPAC IPO are significantly shorter and can be prepared in a
matter of weeks (compared to months for a traditional IPO)”].
63 Scholars point to an additional fourth advantage of SPACs: their applicability
to companies to which traditional IPO are irrelevant. Companies with a
complex business model or with a high level of uncertainty are not well-suited
for IPOs. SPAC mergers are the only reasonable way to enter into such
companies into publicly traded markets. See KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54 at
3.
64 Id.
65 BLOOMBERG LAW, Analysis: Post-Merger SPAC Performance is Mixed, Feb. 12,
2021, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysispost-merger-spac-performance-is-mixed. In a wider time frame of year to date
since the merger, SPACs have fared relatively better, but still a third of the
SPACs have reported a depreciation in value.
61
62
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index by 47.1%, with a negative return of 34.9% as compared to
a positive return of 12.2% for IPOs.66 SPACs have also
underperformed relative to the S&P 500: the average SPAC share
has increased in value by 46% in the period to time between the
beginning of 2019 and February 2021, while the S&P index
exhibited an increase of 52% in the same period.67
The actual underperformance of SPACs, despite their potential
advantages relative to IPOs, has not evaded market participants.
Recently, many sophisticated investors have started to bet
against SPACs.68 Some scholars and commentators have even
warned that there is a SPAC bubble that is about to burst.69
Some commentators are quite critical of the aforementioned
efficiencies ascribed to SPACs. Professors Michael Klausner,
Michael Ohlrogge, and Emily Ruan have provided an account
for why SPACs have not delivered on their promised efficiencies.
They claim that underwriting fees are higher than in traditional
IPOs – not lower as the prevailing belief suggests. Although the
fee as a percentage from the IPO seem lower in the case of SPACs
– 5%-5.5% versus 6.1%-6.8% – these figures do not reflect the
actual proceeds transferred to the company. While the SPAC
pays the underwriting fees as a percentage of all its proceeds in
the IPO, only a fraction of that sum is transferred to the target
company. As we have noted above, after a target is announced,
shareholders have the right to redeem their shares for the cash in
the trust of the SPAC plus interest and not participate in the
merger. On average, 73% of the SPAC shares are redeemed.
When taking redemptions into account, the underwriting fee
from the actual cash transferred to the company, is much higher
and is estimated to reach 16.3%, on average.70

KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 34
Greg Iacurci, Blank Check Funds Are Hot buy May be Risky: ‘The Trust Level is
through
the
Roof,’
CNBC,
Feb.
17,
2021,
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/17/spacs-are-hot-but-may-be-risky-thetrust-level-is-through-the-roof.html.
68 Matt Wirz & Juliet Chung, Short Sellers Boost Bets Against SPACs, WALL ST. J.,
March 14, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-sellers-boost-betsagainst-spacs-11615714200.
69Ivana Naumovska, The SPAC Bubble Is About to Burst, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb.
18, 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-spac-bubble-is-about-to-burst; Joshua
Franklin & Aaron Saldanha, Wall Street’s SPAC sell-off drags on amid fears of
bubble,
YAHOO
FINANCE,
March
6,
2021,
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/wall-streets-spac-sell-off022317571.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2
xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAFH9t48CcMXt5mElRoW2sv5utByRjFRfbPf_5XiNqqSx_fvqtbo_nq33jesnM7yrUSLhpncdHT_QnP1rpZp3jFWiDNZs8pBxkWnpDHmD6sSfHFDxzTRKGTM90_wiV8eDJm6xDXNqLZMD8M_X
M-C_IN7sO4mF1mW7WW4LJ_rw3.
70 KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 22.
66
67
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In addition to the underwriting fee, the cost of the sponsor’s
“promote” is significant,71 and so is the cost of warrants provided
to shareholders that redeem their shares after the announcement,
which in total reaches a staggering average of 50.4% of the cash
delivered.72 This figure is much higher than the cost of a
traditional IPO – even when taking into account the “IPO pop”,
which altogether is estimated at 27%.73
Klausner, Ohlrogge, and Ruan also claim that the price certainty
of SPACs is exaggerated. The uncertainty surrounding SPAC
redemptions also creates price uncertainty of its own. For
example, if the sides agree to a one-for-one share exchange or
any other ratio, the level of redemptions will impact value per
share that the target will receive. If there are no redemptions, all
costs, including underwriting and the promote, are spread over
a larger number of shares, increasing profitability for investors
and the value transferred to the target. If there are many
redemptions, all costs are spread over a smaller number of
shares, decreasing profitability for investors and the value
transferred to the target.
Finally, the claim regarding the speed of SPAC IPOs relative to
traditional IPO is also debated. Some practitioners claim that
there is no significant gap in the speed of the two processes,74 and
it is hard to measure the gap controlling for the different types of
companies that undergo each process.75
The problems that accompany SPACs are not insoluble. The
market can and does correct some of these problems, as can be
seen in the recent case of the Pershing Square Tontine Holdings
SPAC.76 In July 2020, Pershing Square went public with a
modified SPAC structure, addressing the problem of the high
cost of SPACs. The sponsor – Pershing Square – did not take the
standard promote of 25% of the shares. Instead, it received
warrants that were out-of-money and could be exercised or sold
only in a three-year time. In addition, redeeming shareholders
received warrants for only 1/9 of a share, much lower than in
standard SPACs.77
Id. at 21-26.
Id. at 27. The net promote provided to the sponsor is estimated 31.3% of the
cash delivered to the company. In addition, the estimated cost of warrants and
rights provided to shareholders that pulled out is 16.6%.
73 Id. at 31 (this calculation is based on the upper-estimations of IPO pop as
around 20%, and an underwriting fee of 7%).
74 Ramey Layne,et. al., Alternative Routes to Going Public, Initial Public Offering,
De-SPAC or Direct Listing, VINSON & ELKINS MEMO, October 12,2020,
https://www.velaw.com/insights/alternative-routes-to-going-publicinitial-public-offering-de-spac-or-direct-listing/.
75KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54 at 49.
76 Kenneth Squire, Bill Ackman and Tontine Holdings Rewrite the Terms for SPACs,
CNBC (Jul. 22, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/22/bill-ackman-andtontine-holdings-rewrite-the-terms-for-spacs.html.
77 Id.
71
72
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Pershing Square offered additional warrants for non-redeeming
shareholders to incentivize non-redemption. It secured this
result by arranging that the warrants of redeeming shareholders
would be transferred to non-redeeming shareholders. The
implementation of this mechanism had the effect of ensuring that
as more shareholders redeem shares, non-redeemers will gain
more, incentivizing them to stay put. As Pershing Square noted
in its SPAC IPO documents, this structure significantly reduced
the high cost and dilution created by conventional SPACs. This
improved structure elicited a positive reaction from the market:
after the IPO, the share price of Pershing’s SPAC has increased
by 15% and maintained that level in the weeks following the IPO,
a rare event in the pricing of SPACs.78
In the next section, we draw on the lessons from SPACs do
design a new corporate structure, the Activist SPAC, that would
enable direct public investment in Activist campaign. In
constructing the Activist SPAC, we combine the positive aspects
of SPACs with unique new features that correct for the
shortcomings of SPACs. This purpose will require more than a
market correction of the execution structure of SPACs, but also
some regulatory changes that will create a different form of
company, reminiscent of the SPAC.
B. The Unique Structure and Features of ACTIVIST SPACs
In this Section, we propose a new corporate form, termed the
Activist SPAC. The introduction of the Activist SPAC form is
aimed at achieving two purposes: scaling-up shareholder
activism and allowing the public to share in the potential upside
of Activist engagements, which in turn may also improve the
nature of shareholder activism. The Activist SPAC is intended as
a vehicle for raising capital from the public without designating
it to a particular business activity. In this respect the Activist
SPAC is similar to the SPAC, but this is where the similarity
ends. Activist SPACs, as we envision them, would be designated
for investments in public companies and for shareholder activism
purposes only. Standard SPACs, by contrast, are limited to the
acquisition of private companies. This is a fundamental difference
which also affects the mechanism design of Activist SPACs.
The sponsor of an Activist SPAC, who is the lead activist, would
set the company up for the purpose of purchasing a block of
shares in an unspecified public corporation. This would enable
her to influence or pressure management to change the strategic
course of the target company. The sponsor can be an individual
within the activist hedge funds industry – for example, an
activist hedge fund manager who needs additional capital to
realize her investment plans. The sponsor can also be an
78KLAUSNER

ET AL., supra note 54, at 53 (noting that only three SPACs have
maintained prices of 15% or more above IPO price for at least a week during
the first two months following the IPO). The value of PS SPAC has more than
doubled since then, standing as of March 18, 2021 on 27.23.
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outsider, who cannot devise activist strategies within the hedge
fund industry but would like to initiate an activism campaign of
her own.
Similar to the strategy employed by activist hedge funds, the
block purchased by the Activist SPAC would only be a modest
percentage of the public target’s shares, normally up to 10% of
the target.79 Together with the cooperation of other shareholders,
primarily large institutional investors, and possibly also hedge
funds, the block of shares would be enough to influence the
management of the target. Exerting power through the purchase
of a small block of shares enables activists to engage even bluechip companies, with a market cap of over $200 billion, such as
Walt Disney,80 AT&T,81 PayPal,82 Proctor & Gamble,83 ExonMobile,84 GM,85 and even a company with a market cap of over
one trillion dollars, like Apple.86 The financing of activism
through Activist SPACs would make it possible to influence an
even greater number of the largest S&P 500 and Nasdaq
companies by harnessing the resources of retail investors. The
universe of potential targets for activism, which requires a
significant amount of capital of at least $100 million is immense,87
and is not limited to blue chip companies. Given the assumption
that in a classic activism campaign, the activist has to obtain
approximately 10% of the target’s shares, the activist would
require $100 million for a target of $1 billion or more. Globally,
there are almost 3800 public companies with a market cap of at

HAMDANI & HANNES, supra note 15, at 973.
Alex Sherman, Activist Investor Dan Loeb Calls on Disney to end its $3 billion
annual divedend and use the funds for Disney+ Content, CNBC, Oct. 7, 2020,
cnbc.com/2020/10/07/dan-loeb-calls-on-disney-to-suspend-dividendinvest-it-in-disney-plus.html.
81 David Fitzgerald, Activist Investor Challenges AT&T Over Strategy, Board, WALL
ST. J., Sep. 9, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/elliott-managementdiscloses-3-2-billion-stake-in-at-t-11568031530.
82 Greg Bensinger, Icahn: eBay Should Sell 20% of PayPal, WALL ST. J., March 19,
2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/icahn-ebay-should-sell-20-of-paypal1395251394.
83 Julie Creswell, An Epic and Costly, boardroom Battle at Procter & Gamble, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
8,
2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/business/economy/an-epic-andcostly-boardroom-battle-at-procter-gamble.html.
84 Christopher M. Matthews, Activist Likely to Gain Third Seat on Exxon Board,
WALL ST. J., June 2, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-likely-togain-third-seat-on-exxon-board-11622664757
85 Patti Waldmeir, GM Hits Out an Activist Investor Ahead of AGM Showdown,
FIN. TIMES, June 6, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/dd17bbda-848d-31f48523-edfb7542ee38.
86 Robert G. Eccles, Why an Activist Hedge Fund Cares Whether Apple’s Devices Are
Bad for Kids, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 16, 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/01/whyan-activist-hedge-fund-cares-whether-apples-devices-are-bad-for-kids.
87 Less than $100 million is unlikely to justify the fixed costs required for an IPO
of a AIC (quite parallel to the case of SPACs).
79
80
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least $1 billion (3749 to be exact).88 Hence, there are numerous
potential targets for which an activist would need a significant
amount of capital. The Activist SPAC could provide the needed
capital to scale up activism.
The life cycle of the Activist SPAC, as we conceive of it, would
be comprised of five stages: the IPO stage, the search stage, the
redemption stage, the activist campaign stage, and the
dissolution or exit stage.
The first stage is the IPO of the Activist SPAC. Prior to the IPO, a
portion of the shares would be allocated to the sponsor who
initiated the Activist SPAC and bears all the expenses involved
with the IPO and future engagements, including the costs of
research and public relations with respect to the activist
campaign. Immediately following the IPO, all funds raised from
the public would be secured in a trust account. The prospectus
of the IPO of an Activist SPAC would not include the name of
the target company whose shares will be purchased. The
sponsor, however, may restrict the Activist SPAC mandate in the
prospectus to a certain business sector, e.g., the energy sector, or
to a particular activist purpose, e.g., spinning off a part of the
target company. Size limitation on the relevant targets may also
appear in the prospectus,89 and in any case, such size would be
effectively limited by the amount raised by the Activist SPAC.
However, it would be possible for a few Activist SPACs to
cooperate by purchasing shares of the same target to reach
beyond their individual limits. Cooperation is also possible with
other Activists as well including activist hedge funds, forming
“wolf packs” of activists,90 which is quite common in the context
of activism.
The Activist SPAC sponsor cannot be required to disclose the
name of the intended target, even if she knew which company
she would like to engage, for a strategic reason: she cannot
publicize this information. The business model of activist funds
is buying shares in an under-performing company relatively
cheaply, improving the target’s performance and then selling the
shares for a higher price. If the activist were to disclose her
COMPANIESMARKETCAP.COM, Largest Companies by Market Cap,
https://companiesmarketcap.com/page/38/, (last visited June 20, 2021).
89 AIC would have to engage sizable target to justify the use of the public
markets to raise funds for the sake of activism. However, as mentioned in the
text above there are many such relevant targets. In U.S markets, the median
size of a company of the Russell 3000 stock index is $2.7 billion, well above
the required threshold. See Market Capitalization Ranges, FTSE Russell, May 8,
2020,
https://www.ftserussell.com/research-insights/russellreconstitution/market-capitalization-ranges.
90 Activists tend to act in a parallel manner, while intentionally avoiding the
formation of a "group" for the purposes of federal securities laws, which
allows them to evade disclosure duties and corporate defenses See John C.
Coffee & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism
on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 549 (2016).
88
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intention before acquiring its stake, the share price is likely to rise
once the information is shared with the market. This, in turn,
would vitiate the activist’s plan, preventing her from capturing
the full gain from the engagement. Thus, we propose that an
Activist SPAC would be required to disclose its block of shares
10 days after crossing the 5% ownership threshold, just like any
other entity acquiring over 5% of companies’ shares.91
Of course, strategic considerations are not the only reason not to
mandate that an Activist SPAC sponsor disclose the identity of a
target prior to the IPO stage. As is true of SPAC sponsors, an
Activist SPAC sponsor may simply not have a specific target in
mind at the time of the IPO. This is not necessarily bad. Devising
an activist campaign requires meticulous research and
considerable resources. It necessitates close analysis of a few
public companies until the right target is identified. It is not
trivial to expect a sponsor to shoulder these costs alone. A
possible solution would be to allow the sponsor to use some of
the investments in the Activist SPAC to this end. Yet this might
prove problematic: resources that would be invested in research
would not be able to be returned to investors. For this reason, we
think that research expenses should be precluded – the Activist
SPAC should utilize the resources of the trust account only for
the purchase of shares of its target. As noted above, the sponsor
would incur all the expenses related to the activist campaign
including the research cost in return for the promote she
receives.92
While in SPACs the size of the promote typically revolves
around 20% to 25%, the size of the promote in the case of Activist
SPACs, as we envision it, will be somewhat more limited. The
share of the pie of Activist SPAC sponsors should instead be
comparable with those in the hedge fund industry. The typical
cut of hedge fund managers is the so-called “carried interest,”
typically a 20% of the upside generated for the limited partners
who are the hedge fund investors.93 Recall that the average
increase in share price following the entry of an activist is
estimated at around 6%,94 so there is a hefty upside for skilled
91

Id. at 562-568.

92 KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note

54, at 20-21 (emphasizing that the promote should
be designed so that the sponsor would be sensitive mainly to the increase in
its value).
93 A carried interest in hedge funds is a fixed percentage of the profits generated
by the fund, usually 20%, which the general partner receives as compensation.
The payment of the carried interest is typically conditioned upon exceeding a
specific return level for the limited partners of the fund, often known as the
"hurdle rate". Failure to meet the predetermined threshold will lead to a
reduction in the carried interest and might even deny its payment altogether.
See Roger Wohlner, What is Carried Interest and How Doest it Work?, THESTREET
(Aug. 21. 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/funds/what-iscarried-interest-15062756.
94 Bebchuk et al., Pre-disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and
Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 20 (2013)
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Activist SPAC sponsors. Interestingly, it is possible that the
current trend in SPACs would bring their model closer to that of
the hedge fund industry. Thus, the promote is modified to shares
that could be sold only when the public SPAC investors are at
the money, in order to realign the incentives of the sponsor with
those of the other investors.95 In any case, the specific size and
structure of the promote in Activist SPACs will be determined
by market forces and not regulation.
After completing the IPO, the Activist SPAC would enter the
second phase of its existence: searching for a target (if it has not
done so already) and acquiring its shares. As with SPACs,
Activist SPACs should have a pre-determined window in which
they can search for a target to prevent tying up the capital of
investors too long. The two-year limit found in SPACs seems
reasonable for Activist SPACs as well. Unlike the SPAC,
however, the Activist SPAC would not have to disclose the
identity of its target before acquiring its shares, for the strategic
reason noted above – an early disclosure would significantly
decrease its potential profits.
At first glance, investment by public investors without complete
information may appear problematic, but it is actually much less
troubling than it seems. Unlike SPACs that invest in private
companies, Activist SPACs would invest only in public
companies. Investment in public companies is less risky than
investment in private ones for four main reasons. First, the shares
of public companies, especially those of the size relevant for
Activist SPAC activism, are subject to an efficient market pricing
mechanism.96 Frequent market trades by professional investors
both reflect and update the value of the shares on a constant
basis, making it easier to calculate the value of publicly traded
companies. In contrast, the shares of private companies are not
traded on a regular basis, which renders their value highly
speculative.97 Since Activist SPACs would only target public
companies, they involve only a small risk of over-paying for the
target’s shares. Furthermore, since the Activist SPAC is itself a
public company, the shareholders of the Activist SPAC can
always sell their share for approximately the same value of the
shares of the targeted public company. It should also be borne in
mind that activist campaigns typically increase the value of the

KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 20-21.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency after the
Financial Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 313, 325
(2014) ("It is active trading that aggregates information in price, which is why
a claim of price efficiency is weaker all else equal for prices in initial public
offerings than for prices in actively traded secondary markets").
97 The structure of the SPAC induces it even more to pay a high price for the
target, because the sponsor has a strong incentive to close a deal, even if the
terms are detrimental for the SPAC. See KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54 at 20.
95
96
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target company, and it is extremely rare that the share price of
the company decreases after the activist campaign is launched.98
Second, many private companies that go public via SPAC have
very low or no revenues.99 Tellingly, they chose the route of
SPAC over the more conventional IPO process, which makes
them a highly risky investment. In contrast, the vast majority of
public companies have a steady stream of revenues and are thus
safer for investors. Third, and relatedly, private companies rely
on projections of future success to raise money. Projections, of
course, are not hard facts. They are not readily ascertainable.
Indeed, the inclusion of projections in a prospectus of an IPO is
problematic and can expose the company to securities fraud
liability.100 Public companies’ reports offer investors information
about actual performance and transactions. Fourth, and finally,
public companies are subject to stricter regulation than private
companies are. Hence, investors in public companies have a
regulatory safety net that investors in private companies do not
enjoy.
Even though the risk for investors in an Activist SPAC is limited,
we still think that investors in Activist SPACs should be
provided with a redemption option. A redemption option serves
as a market check on the Activist SPAC activism plan because a
high redemption rate may preclude the Activist SPAC from
moving forward with its activism plan. Accordingly, the third
phase in the Activist SPAC’s life cycle would be the redemption
process. An Activist SPAC would be required to disclose its
purchase of shares – 10 days after reaching a 5% threshold, as
well as its basic activism plan for the target company. In cases in
which an Activist SPAC settles for a block of less than 5%, and
does not face a regulatory obligation to disclose its position, the
redemption phase should start 60 days after the purchase of the
first share. When one of these events occur and the target of the
Activist SPAC is disclosed, the investors in the Activist SPAC
would have the option to redeem the shares of her initial
investment minus a portion of the underwriting costs. To
accommodate redemptions, the Activist SPAC will have to
liquidate part of its stake of the target company.
We do not think that the investors in Activist SPACs should be
entitled to redeem their shares for their initial investment plus
interest accrued when there is a drop in the market price of the
target following the acquisition of the Activist SPAC stake. As
the risk in Activist SPACs is much more limited than that of an
investment in a SPAC, the redemption right should also be more
limited. The downside in the case of Activist SPACs is smaller,
Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Returns to
Hedge Fund Activism, 64 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 45, 45 (2008).
99 Chris Bryant, No Revenues is No Problem in the 2020 Stock Market, Bloomberg,
Sep. 18, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-0918/spac-deals-no-revenue-is-no-problem-in-the-2020-stock-market.
100 KLAUSNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 42-43.
98

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3993847

28

SPACtivism

[2022]

consisting mainly of the risk of depreciation of the shares of the
public target due to market fluctuations. In the case of SPACs,
the potential risk is much greater: in the absence of a market
pricing mechanism, the fear of over-payment is substantial.
As noted earlier, redemption would be capped up to the initial
investment minus a portion of the underwriting and research
expenses, in order to prevent an inefficient “stag hunt”
dynamic.101 If share prices of the target go up because of the
activism, those who redeem their Activist SPAC investment
would not enjoy those gains (but they can sell their activist SPAC
shares on the exchange). Otherwise, Activist SPAC shareholders
may be tempted to redeem their investment following the spike
in the target’s share price, once the acquisition and activism plan
is disclosed. In any case, redemption poses less of a problem for
Activist SPACs than for traditional SPACs: there are no exact
terms an Activist SPAC must meet, nor a certain amount it must
reach to go forward with its plans. The volume of redemptions
only has a quantitative effect and not a qualitative effect: as the
block of shares of the Activist SPAC in the target is larger, there
is a greater likelihood that the Activist SPAC would be successful
in its Activist engagement, but there is no formal threshold for
an Activist engagement. The sponsor will have to note the rate of
redemptions that would preclude it to go forward with its
campaign, as that information will serve as a market check for
the strategy plan of the sponsor.102
The fourth phase of the Activist SPAC is the actual activist
campaign. One of the purposes of the Activist SPAC is to enable
an Activist campaign of longer horizons by providing more
“patient” capital than conventional hedge fund financing. For
that reason, the fourth phase should last for an extendable predefined period (e.g., 3 years). The longer horizon of Activist
SPAC s would enables activists to engage in campaigns that
include a proxy fight in a company with staggered boards, which
may require two years to complete, or the implementation of
long-term structural changes that cannot be affected under
extant models of activism. The sponsor would incur the expenses
related to the campaign in return for the promote she received.
To give the sponsor a proper incentive to spend the necessary
amount, it is possible to give her restricted shares that she would
only be able to sell when the other investors are at the money or

The stag hunt is a paradigmatic game in game theory, which depicts the
following scenario: group of hunters attempts to capture a stag. Every hunter
must cooperate to capture the stag. All prefer the stag, but if a hare passes by
one of the hunters, a hunter may catch and eat it, depriving the others of the
opportunity of capturing the stag (but not hares if they begin chasing them.
In such scenarios, the players may fail to cooperate while rushing to achieve
the certain but less desired goal. BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE, 1 (2004).
102 See supra pp. 20-21.
101
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even after a certain target rate is reached.103 However, we believe
that the design of optimal incentives should be left to the market
and not be prescribed by regulation.
The fifth and last phase is dissolution of the Activist SPAC. As
soon as the Aactivist campaign is over, there is no value in
maintaining the Activist SPAC; it is merely a holding company,
whose only asset is the shares of a public company. Thus, at the
end of the Activist campaign period, the Activist SPAC ought to
distribute the shares of the public company it owns as an in-kind
dividend after providing the sponsor the compensation she is
entitled to, and dissolve. An Activist SPAC would be able to
obtain additional time (say, beyond 3 years) in appropriate cases
by a vote of a majority excluding the sponsor.
III. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ACTIVIST SPACS
A. The World of Activism with Activist SPACs
The main rationale for the Activist SPAC form is its ability to
enhance the impact of activism in financial markets. As we will
show in the proceeding discussion, the introduction of Activist
SPACs has the potential to transform the scope and nature of
activism, as we know it. Not only can Activist SPACs
dramatically increase the resources available to activsits, but
they would give the public an opportunity to use activism for
ESG purposes or to support managements of corporations.
1. Forming a Market for Activism: Improving the Functioning of
Activism
Currently, large-scale activism is dominated by activist hedgefunds. The structure of hedge funds influences and even dictates
the form of activism. Introducing a new structure for activism
will facilitate the entrance of new players to the activist arena and
new voices. The diversification and thickening of the activist
arena will contribute to the perfecting of the market for activism
and fortify its ability to self-correct its flaws.
There exists an extensive debate regarding the impact of activist
hedge funds on the market. Many scholars and commentators
point to its positive impact in addressing agency problems,
disciplining management and generating higher value for
shareholders.104 Yet, there are other scholars who are more
sceptical of the positive value of activism. The main concern of
Similarly, to the promote in the Pershing Square SPAC. See Kenneth Squire,
Bill Ackman and Tonite Holdings Rewrite the Terms for SPACs, CNBC, Jul.
23, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/22/bill-ackman-and-tontineholdings-rewrite-the-terms-for-spacs.html (“the truly remarkable departure
from SPAC standard terms is that Pershing Square is not taking any founders
shares…Pershing Square sole compensation for founding an capitalizing the
SPAC and sourcing, negotiating and closing a $10B+ acquisition will be a
6.21% promote after the investors have already received a 20% return”).
104 Supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
103
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the sceptics is that while activist engagements generate value in
the short-run, they harm firms in the long-run. Hedge funds aim
at investing in companies that generate alpha – above market
return. As a result, their investment in targets is limited to the
period in which their surgical strategic operation is executed,
which is relatively short.105 As hedge funds are incorporated as
partnerships, the general partner (the hedge fund’s manager) has
complete control of both the decision to enter the investment and
to terminate it. Thus, all investors in a hedge fund have the same
horizon for their investment.
The Activist SPAC may fundamentally change the investors’
time horizon and, as consequence, the engagement strategy of
the manager. Unlike a hedge fund, the Activist SPAC is
incorporated as a corporation and the manager has control only
of the entry decision—i.e., which company to engage and when
to do it. Activist SPAC Investors can maintain their position in
the target as long as they want, because they can sell the Activist
SPAC shares on a stock exchange, allowing new shareholders to
buy into the activism campaign. And, the shareholders of the
Activist SPAC may hold on to the shares of the target even after
the Activist SPAC dissolves (and transfer its holdings in the
target to the Activist SPAC shareholders).
In contrast to activist hedge funds, whose investors do not care
about the target’s performance in the long run if it is not fully
reflected in current market prices, investors in Activist SPAC
may well care about the long-term performance of the target
company. For this reason, the manager of an Activist SPAC
would have to take into account the investment horizons of all
its investors, including those who plan on staying invested in the
target company well beyond the implementation of the strategic
changes in the target company. An additional reason why
Activist SPACs may generate more “patient” capital than that of
hedge funds is that the exit option will alleviate the pressure on
hedge funds managers to show positive results to the investors
who locked their money in the hedge fund for several years.
Since investors in the Activist SPAC have an exit option, they will
exert less pressure on the managers to show immediate positive
results.
An additional dimension in which Activist SPACs could impact
the functioning and nature of activism is by enabling it to
function as “validation” capital.106 This concept has been
developed in a recent paper by Alon Brav, Dorothy Lund, and
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2020 U.S.
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND ACTIVIST SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS, supra
note14.
106 In recent years, almost half of the campaigns of activist were aimed at
pushing for an M&A deal—47% in the Q1 2021, 41% in 2020 and 47% in 2019.
See LAZARD, Q1 2021 Review of Shareholder Activism, p. 12 (2021),
https://www.lazard.com/media/451619/lazards-q1-2021-review-ofshareholder-activism-vf.pdf.
105
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Edward Rock. Activists are typically expected to change the
course of the target. Brav, Lund, and Rock point to another
function activists can perform: instead of utilizing their block of
shares to pressure management to make changes, they can utilize
their block of shares to “protect” the current course of
management from pressures by other market actors.107 It should
be noted that Brav, Lund and Rock were able to report only a
handful of cases of “validation” by activists. This is
understandable given the current institutional structure of
activism under hedge funds: short-term returns sought by
activist hedge funds are inconsistent with “validation” strategies
as those strategies are not usually amenable to high short-term
returns. In sharp contrast, Activist SPACs, as we perceive them,
would be designed for investors with varying horizons and are
thus would be more suited for “validation” engagements.
Enabling greater implementation of validation campaigns by
Activists is an additional dimension in which Activist SPACs
could change the nature of activism and improve it.
Furthermore, enlarging the pool of activist players will improve
the outcomes of activism and perverse outcomes will be reduced.
If one activist has an inimical activism plan, e.g., to sell the
company in the short term in a sub-optimal transaction, as the
pool of activist actors is larger, it is most likely that other players
will emerge and purchase a stake in order to prevent such suboptimal transaction from occurring.
The introduction of Activist SPACs would also allow retail
investors to leave an impact on financial markets. The GameStop
rally revealed an extensive interest on the part of retail investors
to assume an active role in the stock market. The Activist SPAC
would make it possible to tap into this group of interested retail
investors, allowing them to join conventional shareholder
activism. These investors are currently barred from partaking of
the campaigns of activist hedge funds due to the minimum
wealth requirements that accompany investment in hedge fund
activism. Setting up Activist SPACs would enable these retail
investors to join the pool of active investors and leave a lasting
mark on the market. The inclusion of retail investors in activism
would not be a mere quantitative change, but also a qualitative
one: the characteristics of retail investors are different from the
typical investors in activist hedge funds. Retail investors are
likely to be more open to validation strategies, even if they
cannot generate significantly higher value than passive
investments. They are also more likely to endorse ESG goals, as
we discuss in the next section. Hedge fund investors typically
care about pecuniary returns, while retail investors may be more
willing to reward companies that promote important societal
goals. There are multiple studies that indicate that the public at
Alon Brav, Dorothy Lund and Edward Rock, Validation Capital, NYU LAW
ECONOMICS
RESEARCH
PAPER
NO.
21-06
(2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3786161#.
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large, especially Millennials, have a different perception of the
corporate purpose than traditional Wall Street investors.
To conclude then, Activist SPACs may generate a new form of
activism both is respect to its time frame and with respect to the
type of goals it may strive for. Enlarging the variety of any
market improves it and bolsters the market dynamic of selfcorrecting of flaws. Consequently, Activist SPACs may receive a
warm welcome from regulators, judges, commentators and
scholars who are critical of hedge fund activism.
2. ESG Oriented Activism
Another virtue of the Activist SPAC lies in its potential to
promote ESG objectives. The number of mutual funds with an
ESG criterion for purposes of investment selection has nearly
doubled in the last four years, reaching over $40 billion in assets
in 2020.108 The strong preference of investors for ESG
investments, reflected in the growth of ESG mutual funds, has
trickled down and permeated the backbone of Corporate
America. In 2019, the Business Roundtable, a forum consisting of
the CEOs of prominent corporate firms and chaired by Jamie
Dimon, chair and CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co., redefined the
purpose of a corporation from maximizing shareholders’ returns
to promoting “An Economy that Serves All Americans.”109 In this
statement, corporate CEOs called for incorporating ESG goals
into corporate objectives. Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the
largest mutual fund family, joined the Business Roundtable
statement, together with other leaders of institutional
investors.110 Such unity is highly unique and compelling.
While ESG goals seem to gain traction among investors, many
commentators claim that these goals have not yet become an
integral component in real life corporate agendas.111 Our
explanation of the limited impact of ESG aspirations on the
corporate sphere is the lack of innovative vehicles that would
enable investors to exert influence over management and boards.
ESG DATA INTEGRATION BY ASSET MANAGERS: TARGETING ALPHA, FIDUCIARY
DUTY
&
PORTFOLIO
RISK
ANALYSIS
(June
2020),
Opimas;
http://www.opimas.com/research/570/detail/.
109 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of the
Corporation to Promote ‘AN Economy That Serves All Americans’, Aug. 19, 2019,
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-thepurpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
110 Hugh Grove, John Holcomb, Mac Clouse & Tracy Xu, Analyzing the Business
Roundtable Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation and Linking it to Corporate
Governance, 16 CORPORATE BOARD: ROLE, DUTIES AND COMPOSITION 19, 20
(2020) ("The world's two largest asset managers also signed this statement:
Laurance Fink, CEO of Blackrock with $6.4 trillion of assets under
management with offices in 30 countries and clients in over 100 countries, and
Mortimer Buckley, CEO of Vanguard with $5.3 trillion of assets under
management").
111 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate
Leaders Bargain, S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).]
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Mutual Funds are guided by ESG targets in their support of
shareholder proposals that address ESG matters, such as gender
diversity, employee welfare and environmental sustainability of
the corporation’s activity.112 They may even object to the
nomination of directors suggested by management, based on the
ESG principles incorporated into their guidelines.113 However,
they are barred from employing more aggressive techniques,
such as initiation of a proxy fight with their own candidate for
the board and actively campaigning for strategic changes in the
course of the company. As John Morley has shown, mutual funds
cannot plausibly execute these more aggressive means: the
regulatory price for such actions would be too high.114
Commentators have argued that the limited means employed by
mutual funds bar them from exerting stronger influence on
corporate managements and boards in the promotion of ESG
goals.115
Other commentators have argued that ESG mutual funds are not
actually guided by ESG considerations, even in their investment
decisions, and that their stated ESG objectives are essentially
“greenwash.”116 There is no effective monitoring of investors on
Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index
Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1243 (2020).
113 Asaf Eckstein, The Push Toward Corporate Guidelines, Jan. 2021, available on
SSRN, file:///C:/Users/Adi/Downloads/SSRN-id3705140.pdf. (explaining
the efficacy of the utilization of guidelines by for the monitoring of portfolio
companies by institutional investors).
114 MORLEY, infra note 128.
115 One study even found that there is no difference between the voting pattern
of many of the ESG funds to that of other funds in respect to ESG matters, see
Gita R. Rao, A Surprise About Some ESG Funds—They Actually Vote Against
Environmental and Social Conscious Resolutions, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 18, 2020,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-surprise-about-some-esg-fundsthey-actually-vote-against-environmental-and-socially-consciousresolutions-11608306020. See also Quinn Curtis, Jill E. Fisch & Adriana Z.
Robertson, Do ESG Mutual Funds Deliver on Their Promises, forthcoming MICH.
L.
REV.
(2022),
13,
available
on
SSRN,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839785.
116 See, e.g., Rachel Evans, How Socially Responsible Investing Lost its Soul,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
Dec.
18,
2018,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-18/exxon-greatmarlboros-awesomehow-esg-investing-lost-its-way; Zachary Barker, Socially
Accountable Investing: Applying Gartenberg v. Merril Lynch Asset Management’s
Fiduciary Standard to Socially Responsible Investment Funds, 53 COLUM. J. L. SOC.
PROBS. 283, 286 (2020). This concern has also seemed to trouble the chair of the
SEC, who is considering greater regulation for ESG funds, especially
mandating greater disclosure by the ESG regarding their ESG strategy and its
execution. See SEC Commissioner Elad L. Roisman, Keynote Speech at the
Society for Corporate Governance National
Conference, July 7, 2020, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roismankeynote-society-corporategovernancenational-conference-2020; Allison Herren Lee, Playing the Long Game: The
Intersection of Climate Change Risk and Financial Regulation, Nov. 5, 2020,
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the numerous investments comprising the portfolio of the
mutual fund. Investors cannot even make use of an external ESG
index to monitor and compare the investment of their ESG
mutual fund, due to the numerous conflicting indexes for
measuring ESG.117
In contrast to mutual funds, activist hedge funds can employ
more aggressive mechanisms to achieve ESG goals, such as
engaging in proxy fights and proposing their own board
candidates in order to promote their desired objectives. Recently,
this possibility became reality when the “Engine One” hedge
fund led a successful proxy fight against the management of
Exxon Mobil and succeeded in nominating directors who
supported shifting Exxon’s activity toward renewable energy at
the expense of drilling.118 Yet, such a campaign by a hedge fund
is the exception, rather than the rule. Ordinarily, hedge funds do
not pursue ESG goals, directed at benefitting the wider public.
Rather, they focus on the attainment of narrow financial goals
that have a quick impact on the company’s shares, such as spinoffs of company assets, slashing R&D expenses, or altering the
compensation structure of management. As we already
explained, hedge funds’ structure, as partnerships with a defined
horizon and illiquid investment of the limited partners, as well
as high powered financial incentives of their general partners,
direct them to enhance share value of the companies they invest
in as quickly as possible.119 They are hardly the best candidates
to pursue ESG goals that often require very long investment
horizons and even sacrifice of returns for a greater cause.
The Activist SPAC may fill the void that currently exists in the
realm of ESG activism. Unlike mutual funds, Activist SPACs are
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-playing-long-game-110520. For a
critique of this argument, finding a significant difference between the
investment pattern of ESG mutual funds and non-ESG mutual funds, see
CURTIS, FISCH & ROBERTSON, supra note 115, at 26-51.
117 For example, in some ESG rankings Tesla scores the highest score in the
MCSI ESG rating, and lowest from the FTSE ESG rating. See James
Mackintosh, Is Tesla or Exxon More Sustainable? It Depends Whom You Ask,
WALL. ST. J. Sept. 17, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-tesla-orexxon-more-sustainable-it-depends-whomyou-ask-1537199931.
For
a
systematic study of the variation among ESG ratings, and the problem that is
poses for monitoring ESG mutual funds, see Florian Berg, Julian Kölbel, &
Roberto Rigobon, Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG Ratings (May 17,
2020). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438533 (comparing ratings from six
prominent agencies and reporting substantial differences); Feifei Li & Ari
Polychronopoulos, What a Difference an ESG Ratings Provider Makes!, Research
Affiliates,
Jan.
2020,
https://www.researchaffiliates.com/en_us/publications/articles/what-adifference-an-esg-ratingsprovider -makes.html; Dana Reiser & Anne Tucker,
Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1921, 2003 (2020).
118 See MATTHEWS, supra note 32 and LEVINE, supra note 34.
119 See supra note 30-32 and the accompanying text..
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not barred from employing aggressive measures to achieve their
goals. Unlike hedge funds, Activist SPACs do not require
investors to forgo liquidity. Consequently, Activist SPACs do not
have to adopt the high-powered and short-termed-focused
incentives that characterize hedge funds. This combination may
enable Activist SPACs to serve as an ideal investment vehicle for
investors interested in promoting ESG objectives, and we expect
that Activist SPACs, which emphasize ESG goals at the stage of
their IPO, will draw much attention from investors who are
inclined toward these purposes. Such Activist SPACs could
utilize aggressive measures for promoting ESG objectives with
less pressure from investors to show immediate profitability. An
investor who is sceptical about the desirability of the Activist
SPAC’s ESG strategy can exit by selling her shares.120 In addition,
unlike mutual funds, Activist SPACs enable investors to monitor
more easily and effectively their ESG strategy. Furthermore,
Activist SPACs cannot hold a portfolio of many companies, but
must focus on an engagement in one company.121 The Activist
SPAC must notify its investors of the target it chose and the
strategy it is planning to employ, which makes it easier for a
retail investor to evaluate whether the strategy promotes her
preferred ESG goals. If not, she would be able to redeem her
shares, and thereby communicate both to the Activist SPAC
management and the market that it is not the type of ESG
strategy that she had envisioned.
3. ACTIVIST SPACs Impact on the Scope of Activism: Widening the
Scope of Activism
Even among supporters of activism, there are doubts about its
actual impact. Activism in its current form has a limited scope.
As we noted, the 16.1 billion dollars invested by hedge fund
Activists in 2020 constituted a mere 0.0322% of the aggregate
market cap of all U.S. firms.122 There are a few factors that cause
the impact of the hedge fund activism to loom larger than its
proportional market share. First, activist hedge funds often
cooperate with other large actors, such as institutional investors.
As they obtain only a relatively small block of shares of the
The skepticism does not have to arise regarding the normative desirability
of the changes in the company the hedge fund is pushing for. As Max M.
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff have noted, one should distinguish
between “collateral benefits ESG”- directed to benefiting third parties based
on the ethical views of the trustee, and “Risk-return ESG” in which ESG is a
strategy for obtaining superior risk-adjusted return based on the premise that
there is a correlation between the two. See Max M. Schnzenbach & Robert
Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics
of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 397-98 (2020). Based on their
distinction, a Risk-return ESG oriented investor, may object to a certain ESG
investment not on ethical grounds—that it does not coincide with her ethical
preferences—but that it will not generate superior returns.
121 This is due to the legal restirctions of the Investment Company Act, see infra,
note 134.
122 See Supra, note 5.
120
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companies that they engage, activist hedge funds need support
from other actors to achieve their goals. In many cases,
institutional investors are happy to cooperate as they stand to
benefit from successful engagements, without incurring the
same costs. Second, the impact of activist hedge funds is not
limited to the companies they engage. activist hedge funds have
a broad disciplining effect – even on companies they do not
engage. The mere threat of an engagement is likely to improve
how firms are being run. Fearing that an Activist engagement
would lead to their replacement, managements of underperforming companies strive to avoid an Activist campaign
against them. An effective way to achieve this goal to improve
firm performance and thus make it a less lucrative target for
Activists.
While it is true that the impact of activist hedge funds is greater
than the effect one would expect to see given the limited
resources of funds, activism in its current form falls short of
realizing its potential. Even with the help of institutional
investors, activist hedge funds managed to engage only 80 of the
3500 publicly traded companies (with a market value above $500
million) in the U.S. 2020.123 While we openly acknowledge that
the salutary effect of activist hedge fund engagements goes
beyond the target targets, it cannot reach, in its current scope, all
publicly traded companies – or even the majority. Presently, the
probability of engagement is quite low and stands at 2.3%. With
such low probability, the deterrent effect of hedge funds is very
modest. An increase in the number of engagements, will also
increase the deterrence effect of hedge funds and can have a
significant market wide impact.
B. Activist SPAC as the “Poor Man’s” activist Hedge Fund
Introducing Activist SPACs would not only change the nature of
activism but would also have a distributive impact.
Traditionally, exposure to activist hedge fund activity has been
limited to certain institutional investors, private equity funds
and affluent individuals. These limitations are driven primarily
by regulation.124

See supra note 2 and the accompanying text.]
A non-public company is limited to 35 individuals, unless they are
“accredited investors.” 124 The definition of “accredited individuals” is
individuals with a net worth of at least one million dollars or minimum
income of $ 200,000.124 If they are accredited, there could be up to 99 investors
in the fund. See THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT (1940), §3(c)(1). If all investors
are qualified purchases—with a liquid net worth of $5 million or less—the
fund can qualify as a section 3(c)(7) company and consist of up to 499
investors. See Id. at §3(c)7. The reason for this limitation is that hedge funds,
in contrast to mutual funds, are not regulated. The risk of unregulated activity
is higher and thus the regulatory approach is to limit exposure to the risk only
to individuals who can bear the cost of the risk should it materialize.
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Most retail investors are not qualified to participate in hedge
fund activism and thus do not get to share in the benefits it
produces. In 2020, activist hedge funds gained 17.75%, on
average. For comparison’s sake, the return on investing in the
S&P 500 index for 2020 was 15.76%.125 Relative to investment in
the S&P 500 index, Investors in activist hedge funds had
generated returns that were 15% higher than the returns on
market benchmark, such as the S&P 500. The average retail
investor cannot get this abnormal return, however. Furthermore,
activist hedge funds offer another advantage to their investors:
relative insularity to market risk. The returns of activist hedge
funds are primarily derived from improving companies, and
thus can be generated even in a bear market.126
The introduction of Activist SPACs would improve the current
state of retail investors in three respects. First, investment in
Activist SPACs would be open to all retail investors. It would not
be conditioned on the individual wealth. Second, because
Activist SPACs would only buy shares in public companies, and
because the Activist SPAC own shares are traded on the
exchange, the retail investors holdings will be highly liquid. This
means that retail investors can liquidate their shares at any time.
Hedge funds, by contrast, are illiquid. Hedge funds are
structured as partnerships and the funds invested in them are
locked in for a period of 7 to 10 years. Consequently, even
wealthy individuals may be reluctant to join activist hedge fund
campaigns. Locking a considerable portion of one’s wealth for an
extended period involves a high opportunity cost.127 Third, the
proliferation of Activist SPACs would provide retail investors
with the opportunity to diversify their activism portfolio. The
fact that Activist SPACs could take any amount of money would
enable retail investors to invest in multiple Activist SPACs as
well as any other investment. Doing so would allow them to
hedge their bets and not lose their capital if a particular Activist
SPAC fails.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
In this Part, we discuss three potential objections that may be
raised against our proposal. The first objection we discuss
maintains that if Activist SPACs were as useful as we claim, they
would exist already. The present absence of Activist SPACs, so
the argument goes, indicates that there is no need for the new
PREQIN,
Hedge
Fund
Performance
Update:
December
2020,
file:///C:/Users/Adi/Downloads/e12d8607-b224-4545-91d0-034e51604ae7-PreqinHedge-Fund-Performance-Update-December-2020.pdf.
126 See
HEDGE FUND ALPHA: A FRAMEWORK FOR GENERATING AND
UNDERSTANDING INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE (2009), 5-6 (demonstrating how
hedge funds outperformed the market in the bear market of 2000-2002).
127 Regarding the high value of liquidity to low socioeconomic individual which
requires an especially high liquidity premium, see Adi Libson, Confronting the
Retiremenet Savings Problem, 54 HARV. J. LEGIS. 207, 233-34 (2017).
125
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corporate form we propose. The second objection is that the
introduction of Activist SPACs might threaten the protection
granted to investors under the Investor Advisor Act by allowing
mutual funds to pass themselves off as Activist SPACs. The third
objection is that there is too much activism already and therefore
Activist SPACs are not needed. We will address these objections
in turn.
A. Why Doesn’t the Market Generate Activist SPACs
A classic objection that might be raised against our proposal is:
why hasn’t the market generated Activist SPACs on its own?
This objection is known in academic circles as “the Chicago
school objection.” The assumption underlying the objection is
that if there were market demand for a new activism tool, it
would exist already. Academic theorizing, clever thought it may
be, is no match for the creativity of markets – especially financial
ones. Thus, any academic proposal that presumes to improve the
operation of markets is suspect. If Activist SPACs present the
myriad advantages we discussed, and may improve Activist
campaigns, why hasn’t the market generated this corporate form
on its own? Sophisticated investors should have discerned the
potential of this corporate form and employed it to their benefit.
It is implausible that academics have detected an investment
pattern that has alluded many sophisticated investors with highpowered incentives.
Although this objection typically poses a challenge to innovative
academic proposals and ordinarily should be taken seriously, it
misses the mark in our case. The answer to the question “why
are there no Activist SPACs” is simple: regulation. As we
explained throughout the Essay, under current regulation the
formation of an Activist SPAC or a similar investment structure
is not possible. Rule 419 requires a blank cheque company to
inform investors of the identify of its potential target before it
acquires it. This requirement precludes investment instruments
akin to the Activist SPAC. The basic feature of activist strategy is
to form a block of shares under the market’s radar in order to
purchase the shares of the target cheaply and benefit from the
increase in the company’s value as a result of the engagement.
Disclosing the activist’s potential target, will likely cause an
increase in the target’s share price. Such an increase before the
activist’s formation of its block of shares might render the
planned campaign unprofitable and thereby prevent it from
occurring. Without a regulatory reform the investment strategy
on which activist SPACs are predicated cannot executed. Hence,
it is not surprising that Activist SPACs are presently missing
from the market.
One may also query whether there is a need for a blank cheque
company that uses public funds for activism. What precludes
managers of mutual funds from deploying the funds they have
at their disposal to promote activism? After all, the assets
managed by mutual funds originate with the public at large.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3993847

[2022]

SPACTIVISM

39

Allegedly, activism by mutual funds will be very similar to that
of Activist SPAC.
The reply to this argument is two-fold. First, legal requirements
de-facto bar managers of institutional investors from playing a
direct role in activism. John Morley has provided a convincing
account of the many legal barriers that prevent mutual funds
from acting like activists.128
For one, mutual funds disclose their holdings by filing a schedule
13G form, instead of a 13D form, when crossing the 5%
ownership threshold. Form 13G is meant for passive holders and
sidesteps the expansive disclosure requirements mandated by
form 13D, which include a report of all trade in the two-month
period that preceded a change of its block by 1% or more.129 Such
disclosure is extremely burdensome for mutual funds that
engage in frequent trades of the shares of their portfolio
companies. Because no such reporting is required under
schedule 13G, reporting under schedule 13G, instead of a 13-D,
is crucial for institutional investors. However, only passive
investors that have no intention to influence the strategy of the
corporation are allowed to use the lenient 13G Schedule.
The second and more well-known explanation for why mutual
funds do not engage in activism is their regulated fee-structure
that limits their incentives to engage in activism.130 The
Investment Advisory Act, which regulates the fee structure of all
investment advisers registered with the S.E.C., including all
mutual funds, precludes them from utilizing an aggressive
success-based fee in order to protect the investments of ordinary
moms and pops from excessive risk.131 Due to the low sensitivity
of mutual funds to increases in the value of their portfolio
companies, and their strict focus on offering low fees to
investors, they are disinclined to engage in activism.132 While the
Investment Advisory Act provides an answer to the question
“why mutual funds do not provide a solution for retail investors
who wish to engage in activism,” it gives rise to a second

John D. Morley, Too Big to be Activist, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2019).
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a).
130 For additional explanation for lack of activism by mutual funds and other
traditional institutional investors, see GILSON & GORDON, supra note 16, at 899895.
131 15 U.S.C. § 80b-(a)(1). So called “Fulcrum Fee” structures are allowed, but
those provide only lame incentives. As such performance-based fee structure
rewards managers with a component of the fund's excess return over a
prespecified benchmark, it symmetrically imposes a monetary "fine" in case
of underperformance with respect to said benchmark. See Juan Sotes-Paladino
& Fernando Zapatero, Carrot and Stick: A Risk-Sharing Rationale for Fulcrum
Fees in Active Fund Management (2021), available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2143838..
132 Marcel Kahn & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders be Shareholders, 100 B. U. L. REV. 1771, 1775 (2020).
128
129
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objection to our proposal: isn’t the ACTIVIST SPAC in conflict
with the Investment Advisory Act? We turn to this question next.
B. Does the Activist SPAC Conflict with the Investors Advisors Act
and the Investment Company Act?
The Activist SPAC structure, as we designed it, provides
remuneration to the Activist SPAC’s management for identifying
a target for activism and successfully executing an activist
campaign. These activities require expertise, sophistication, and
investment of considerable resources. As we have noted, the
compensation would come in the form of a share of the profits
from the campaign. We did not set the precise percentage of
shares management would receive. Instead, we left it to the
market to determine the appropriate level of compensation.
Although we cannot predict the managers cut, it may possibly
reach 20% of the profits – similar to the carried interest
compensation of activist hedge funds’ managers.
The compensation structure of the Activist SPAC conflicts with
the Investment Advisory Act, which prohibits registered
investment advisors from charging a share of the capital
appreciation of the funds.133 Creating an entity such as an
Activist SPAC and exempting it from the Investment Advisory
Act prohibition, runs the risk of undermining the protection the
act provides to common investors. Funds could define
themselves as Activist SPACs in order circumvent the successbased-fee prohibition. There does not seem to be a clear-cut mark
which distinguishes the function of an Activist SPAC and other
mutual funds. It is true that Activist SPACs actively engage with
the company in which they invest, but funds could easily feign
active engagements by sending a letter to the management
regarding a suggested reform or voting against the directors
proposed by management. These actions by themselves are not
costly – the main cost element they implicate is the strategic
planning behind them, which is much harder to discern. Similar
to the claim that many active mutual funds are actually “closet”
passive funds (which index their investment, rather then actively
engage in stock picking), there may be Activist SPACs which are
essentially “closet” mutual funds. The ability of mutual funds to
pass themselves off as Activist SPACs, would undermine the
regulatory framework of mutual funds intended to protect
ordinary investors.
However, there is a critical distinction between Activist SPACs
and mutual funds. Activist SPACs, as we envision them, are
15 U.S.C. § 80b-(a)(1) (“No investment advisor a registered or required to be
registered with the Commission shall into, extend or renew any investment
advisory contract, or in any way perform any investment advisory contract
entered into, extended, or renewed on or after November1, 1940, if such
contract…(1) provides for compensation to the investment adviser on the
basis of a share of capital gains or capital appreciation of the funds or any
portion of the funds of the client.”).

133
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limited to investment in one company. Mutual funds, by
contrast, must invest in multiple companies. This difference is
not merely conceptual. It has far reaching practical implications.
First, it would prevent mutual funds from passing themselves off
as Activist SPACs. The main service mutual funds provide for
their clients is diversification of their investment. As Activist
SPACs are limited to investing only in one company, mutual
funds will not be able to imitate the business model of Activist
SPACs and the protection the Investor Advisors Act grants to
investors in mutual funds will not be lost or compromised. The
business model of mutual funds is predicated on diversification
and therefore it is completely antithetical to the defining
characteristic of Activist SPACs – investment in a single
company. Second, section 3(b)(2) of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 grants the SEC the discretion to exclude from the
definition of an “investment company” any issuer that “declares
to be primarily engaged in a business or businesses other than
that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or trading in
securities either directly or (A) through majority-owned
subsidiaries or (B) through controlled companies conducting
similar types of businesses.”134 Importantly, the SEC has adopted
a very expansive definition of control in the context of rule 13D,
interpreting the term to include any intervention in a company’s
strategy. If the same capacious definition were to be adopted also
in the context of the Investment Company Act, sponsors of
ACTIVIST SPACs would be able to receive performance-based
compensation. Obviously, we would encourage the SEC to adopt
this option not only for consistency’s sake, but also to enable and
assure the effective operation of Activist SPACs.135
C. Is There a Real Need for Activist SPACs?
The third and final objection goes to one of the core premises
underlying our Essay, namely, that the current level of activism
is sub-optimal. In part I, we noted that activists only engage 2.3%
of publicly traded corporations. Although this figure seems
small to us and to many other commentators,136 one might argue
that there is no need to enlarge the scope of activism as the
current level of activism is optimal, or even excessive.
Given current data, it is impossible to determine the optimal
level of activism with any degree of certainty. However, we do
not believe that the uncertainty regarding the optimal level of
activism stands as bar to adopting our proposal. The reason is
simple: we do not intend to force financial actors to adopt our
model. We merely call for the addition of the Activist SPAC to
the Activist toolkit. Adding another option to the menu of
15 U.S.C. §80a-3(b)(2).
the SEC chooses not to adopt such wide interpretaion for control
in the context of the Investment Company Act, it is possible to incorperate the
wide conception of control by legislation.
136 Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2056 (2019).
134

135 Naturally, if
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activist comes at no real cost to society. The implementation of
our proposal necessitates a change of rule 419 of the SEC
regulation to allow Activist SPACs to disclose the identity of the
target a short while after it acquired a block of shares in the
target. This change is necessary to enable the successful
operation of Activist SPACs. In essence, the introduction of
Activist SPACs requires a simple act of deregulation, whose cost
is minimal. Thereafter, Activists would be free to use Activist
SPACs, but nothing would compel them to do so. The success or
failure of the Activist SPAC would be left to the market.
Currently, there is no way of knowing whether we have reached
the right level of activism. The only way to determine the optimal
level of activism is by removing all barriers to new models of
activism and allowing the market to operate. We argue that
Activist SPACs present a strong prima facie case for market
experimentation. Even if in the short-run, the introduction of
Activist SPACs would generate too much activism, in the longrun, after generating low returns, Activist SPACs would become
unpopular, and investors would stop using them. In contrast, if
Activist SPACs continue to be suppressed from the market the
cost is likely to be high: if the current level of activism is too low,
agency costs in public companies would persist to the detriment
of the public.
Furthermore, at present, the market for activism is based on a
single model – that of activist hedge funds. Startlingly, there is
no competition in the market for activism, which is puzzling in
and of itself. The addition of Activist SPACs would not only
foster competition in the market for activism, but would have
two additional desirable effects. First, it would allow the public
to partake of the world of activism. Currently, the public at large
has no foothold in the activist realm. Retail investors who would
like to share in the gains arising from activism have no ability to
do so. It is true that activism carries risks with it and not all
activist engagements are successful. Yet, the design of Activist
SPACs offers a high degree of protection to lay investors, while
allowing them to participate in the upside of activism.
Second, Activist SPACs portend a new kind of activism – one
with longer horizons and without locked-in capital. We believe
that the unique features of the Activist SPAC would attract new
money to the world of activism. Numerous scholars have
criticized the impatient and short-termed nature of activism by
activist hedge funds. The different structure of the Activist SPAC
would provide a different path for activism. As Activist SPACs
enable investors to exit more easily from their investment by
selling their shares in the Activist SPAC in public, the more
“patient” capital it provides may impact the pattern of activism.
This, in turn, would enable investors in Activist SPACs to
implement activist strategies that require longer engagements
and give good managements an opportunity to engage in
strategic planning that benefits companies in the long haul.
Hence, activism of Activist SPAC may be able to address agency

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3993847

[2022]

SPACTIVISM

43

problems that the quickly exiting hedge funds activists do not
address. The ability of Activist SPACs to introduce a new kind of
activism should allay the concerns of the critics who maintain
that we already have enough activism. As we demonstrated time
and again, the analysis cannot be strictly quantitative by focusing
exclusively on the level of activism on the market, and must,
instead, incorporate a qualitative dimension by looking at the
types, or models, of activism the market offers.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we offered a new corporate structure that can
transform the market for corporate activism. Currently, only
sophisticated, wealthy investors can partake in the advantages of
Activist investments. Retail investors are excluded from the
scene, notwithstanding their clearly manifested desire to have a
voice in the corporate world. The exclusion of retail investors
from the domain of activism harms not only the investors
themselves, but also the quality corporate governance across the
board. The existing model enables activists to engage only 2.3%
of public corporations. The limited scope of activism is due to
three interlocking reasons: (a) the exclusive reliance on the funds
of sophisticated investors, primarily activist hedge funds; (b)
regulation that prevents retail investors from entering the world
of activism, and (c) the dearth of corporate forms suitable for
activism.
All three hurdles can be overcome by the introduction of the
Activist SPAC. The Activist SPAC is uniquely designed to give
the public a foothold in the domain of activism, on the one hand,
while providing it with maximal protection against abuse on the
other. Adoption of our proposal cannot only improve corporate
governance by enhancing dramatically the scope of activism, but
also by changing its nature. As we showed throughout this
Essay, Activist SPACs are especially attractive to patient
investors with long horizons. Likewise, Activist SPACs are
conducive to the advancements of ESG goals. Therefore, Activist
SPACs provide an effective tool for effectuating the preferences
of the American public with respect to how corporations should
be managed and the goals they are supposed to promote. We also
demonstrated that the introduction of Activist SPACs requires
minimal (yet necessary) changes in the existing regulatory
framework and imposes no other costs. Considering this fact, our
Essay establishes a strong prima facie case for permitting Activist
SPACs, at least as a market experiment. The potential benefits of
Activist SPACs are significant, while the risk is small. Financial
markets have always prided themselves on innovation; the
introduction of Activist SPACs can be a meaningful step forward
along that path.
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